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Abstract 
Main purpose of the study is to identify the relationship between corporate governance and company 
performance of financial service industry of Sri Lanka from financial year 2008-2011. There were 33 banks, 
finance and insurance organizations listed in the CSE as at 1st April 2007.20 of these organizations have been 
selected randomly as the sample of the study. The governance variables and performance variables are tested 
under Simple Linear Regression model to identify any relationships. The three variables related to Corporate 
Governance are included in this study (Board size, board composition and Audit Committee) while performance 
of the firms is measured by return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE).the study however could not 
provide a significant relationship between the two performance measures and corporate governance. These 
results are consistent with prior empirical study.  
Keywords: Corporate Governance, company performance, financial service industry, Sri Lanka. 
 
Introduction 
Corporate governance has become a popular discussion topic in developed and developing countries. The widely 
held view that corporate governance determines firm performance and protects the interests of shareholders has 
led to increasing global attention. However, the way in which corporate governance is organized differs between 
countries, depending on the economic, political and social contexts. 
Corporate Governance refers to the way an organization is directed, administrated or controlled. It includes the 
set of rules and regulations that affect the manager’s decision and contribute to the way company is perceived by 
the current and potential stakeholders. The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and 
responsibilities among different participants in the corporation such as; boards, managers, shareholders and other 
stakeholders and spells out the rules and procedures and also decision making assistance on corporate affairs. By 
doing this, it also provides the structure through which the company’s objectives are set and the means of 
obtaining those objectives and monitoring performance. Corporate governance may be the ways of bringing the 
interests of investors and managers into line and ensuring that firms are run for the benefit of investors. 
According to OECD principles corporate governance is a system by which business corporations are directed 
and controlled. The corporate governance structures specify the distribution of rights and responsibilities among 
different participants in the corporation, such as the board, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders, and 
spells out the rules and procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs. By doing this, it provides the 
structure through which the company objectives are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and 
monitoring performance (OECD 1999). 
Internationally there is a growing recognition of the importance of corporate governance for the success of a firm. 
Several countries have issued guidelines and recommendations for best governance practices. However, whether 
firms following the best practice recommendations regarding Corporate Governance will indeed perform better 
is a question to be examined empirically in Sri Lankan context. Sri Lankan listed firms have to follow a set of 
guidelines with respect to CG practices. Even though these are not binding on firms, compliance is expected at 
least by firms listed in the stock exchange. Since the sample of the firms chosen for the current study comes from 
Sri Lanka, it provides opportunity to examine linkage between Corporate Governance and firm performance in 
Sri Lankan context. 
In Sri Lanka, the Financial Services Industry also plays a considerable role in the economic development and 
business improvement. The Financial Services Industry has become increasingly competitive over the past few 
decades and many of Financial Services organizations have invested heavily in infrastructure, technology 
process and agriculture, etc in this country. Therefore the financial performances of the Financial Services 
Industry are also very important to Financial Services organizations and country.  
According to Cadbury (1992), corporate governance is the mechanism used to discipline organizations. Morin 
and Jarrell (2001) argue that corporate governance mechanism is a framework that controls and safeguards the 
interest of the relevant players in the market which include managers, employees, customers, shareholders, 
executive management, suppliers and the board of directors. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Several studies have been conducted so far and still going on to examine the relationship between firm 
performance and corporate governance mechanisms, but the results are mixed. 
It is widely acclaimed that good corporate governance enhances a firm’s performance (Brickley et al, 1994; 
Brickley and James, 1987; Byrd and Hickman, 1992; Chung et al, 2003; Hossain et al, 2000; Lee et al, 1992; 
Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990; Weisbach, 1988). In spite of the generally accepted notion that effective corporate 
governance enhances firm performance, other studies have reported negative relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance (Bathala and Rao, 1995; Hutchinson, 2002) or have not found any relationship 
( Prevost et al. 2002; Young, 2003). 
Yermack (1996) examines the relation between board size and firm performance, concluding that the smaller the 
board sizes the better the performance, and proposing an optimal board size of ten or fewer. John and Senbet 
(1998) maintain that the findings of Yermack have important implications, not least because they may call for 
the need to depend on forces outside the market system in order to determine the size of the board. 
Hence, as board size increases board activity is expected to increase to compensate for increasing process losses 
(Vafeas, 1999). The argument is that large boards are less effective and are easier for a CEO to control. The cost 
of coordination and processing problems is also high in large boards and this makes decision-taking difficult. On 
the other hand, smaller boards reduce the possibility of free-riding and therefore have the tendency of enhancing 
firm performance. 
Keeping boards small can help improve their performance. When board gets beyond seven or eight people they 
are less likely to function effectively and are easier for the CEO to control (Jensen 1993). In contrast, research in 
the area suggests that as groups increase in size, they become less effective because of coordination and process 
problems outweighing the advantages gained from having people of diverse background (Steiner, 1972).  
Empirical evidence regarding the relationship between firm performance and board composition is mixed. 
Baysinger and Butler (1985) found that firms with higher numbers of outside directors on the board had a greater 
return on equity than the board with inside directors. Ezzamel and Watson (1993) also found that outside 
directors were positively associated with profitability among a sample of UK firms. Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1991) and Bhagat and Black (2002) find no correlation between the degree of board independence and four 
measures of firm performance, 20 European Journal of Economics, Finance and Administrative Sciences - Issue 
14 (2008) controlling for a variety of other governance variables, including ownership characteristics, firm and 
board size and industry. They find that poorly performing firms were more likely to increase the independence of 
their board.  
The outside directors are in a position to exert an intensive influence on the management because they are 
independent financially and is of different self interest than the inside directors hence are in a position to protect 
the interest of the shareholders than the inside directors ( Fama, 1980). On the other hand, studies by Klein 
(1998), Bhagat et al (1997), and Hermalin et al (1991) experienced a high proportion of independent directors 
does not predict a better future accounting performance.  
The Cadbury committee (Cadbury 1992) also recommends that the ideal size of the board should be between 
eight and ten members and that there had to be one executive director for every non-executive director.   
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) find no association between the proportion of outside directors and Tobin’s Q 
and Bhagat and Black (2002) find no linkage between the proportion of outside directors and Tobin’s Q, return 
on assets, asset turnover and stock returns. 
Velnampy (2013), analyzing publickly traded SriLankan manufacturing companies find that determinants of 
corporate governance are not correlated to the performance measures of the organization. Regression model 
showed that corporate governance don’t affect companies’ ROE and ROA. This result was supported by 
Achchuthan that, there is no significant mean different between the firm performance among corporate 
governance as board leadership structure, board committees 
practices, board meetings and proportion of non executive directors.  
Zhaoyang Guo and Udaya Kumara Kgab(2012), state that, (i) board size and proportion of non- executive 
directors in the board shows a marginal negative relationship with firm value, (ii) proportion of non-executive 
directors in a board and financial performance of firm shows negative relation contrary to the findings of 
previous studies. The firm size and director shareholdings have a significant impact on firm performance of 
listed firms in Sri Lanka.  
Kumi Heenetigala and Anona Fern Armstrong (2011), Suggest a positive relationship 
between governance practices (separate leadership, board composition, board committee and firm performance) 
based on return on equity, and board composition, board committees and performance measured by Tobin’s Q. 
These relationships indicate that firms have implemented corporate governance strategies, which have 
resulted in higher profitability and share price performance.  
The present paper aims to improve the literature on the corporate governance - company performance linkage by 
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providing an analysis of the Sri Lankan financial service industry for four years (2008-2011) and analyzing 
board of directors attributes. 
 
RESEARCH MODEL 
Based on a review of the relevant literature, this research investigates corporate governance practices and firm 
performance in a particular business environment. A conceptual framework developed in this section provides a 
framework to understand the affects of the variables on firm performance, and identifies the hypotheses 
regarding the relationship of corporate governance variables to firm performance in Sri Lanka. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OBJECTIVES 
 Investigate the extent to which the companies have adopted corporate governance practices. 
 Determine the relationships between corporate governance practices (such as Board, Audit 
Committee) on firm performance 
HYPOTHESIS 
[1] There is a positive relationship between corporate governance and ROE 
[2] There is a positive relationship between corporate governance and ROA 
SAMPLE SELECTION 
There were thirty nine banks, finance and insurance organizations listed in the CSE as at 10th January 2010. As 
per the scope of the study researcher has selected these organizations listed in the CSE as the population. Twenty 
of these organizations have been selected randomly as the sample of the study. 
 
PERIOD OF THE STUDY 
The study examined the data for the years 2008 to 2011. The reason for selection of the years was that the 
corporate governance guidelines were introduced in 2003. Four years later, 2007, was a suitable time period, in 
which companies who had adopted the practices could have been expected to show some change in adoption of 
the practices and if this had had an impact on company performance. Reporting of corporate governance practices 
was voluntary during this period. The code of corporate governance was mandated in 2007 to be effective for 
companies reporting on or after the 1
st 
April 2008. Therefore, the year 2007 was an important year to examine the 
effectiveness of the voluntary code on performance.  
 
DATA COLLECTION 
The data and information required for the study were collected from the Colombo Stock Exchange (CSE) 
websites, annual reports, and the Colombo Stock Exchange publication “The Hand book of listed companies”.. 
Evidence required to test the hypotheses in this study is based on annual reports and published statistics. 
Therefore data derived for this study is from secondary sources. 
 
METHODS OF DATA ANALYSIS 
SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Science) was used to analysis the data to test the hypothesis. The suitable 
tools were used to test the hypothesis and find the reliability. Following techniques are used to validate the 
findings and to get best solution. Correlation analysis is used to identify the strength or weakness of relationship 
between corporate governance practices on firm performance. Regression analysis is used to identify how 
corporate governance practices effect on firm performance and as well as other factors extends. 
Corporate 
governance 
Board size  
 
Board Independence 
Audit committee size 
Company 
Performance 
Return on 
Equity  
 
Return on 
Assets 
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VARIABLES DESCRIPTION  
Described below are the variables used to operationalise the constructs. They include the corporate governance 
variables (board size, board composition and audit committees) and company performance. 
Concept variable Measurement 
Company 
Performance 
 
Dependent variable   
Return on Equity[ROE] 
 
Earnings before interest and tax 
         Total equity shares in issue 
Return on assets [ROA] Earnings before interest and tax 
                   Total asset 
Corporate 
Governance 
Characteristics 
Independent variable   
Board size Number of directors on the board. 
Board composition Proportion of outside directors sitting on the board. 
Size of audit committee Number of members of audit committee 
 
MODEL 
The following conceptual model was formulated through the extensive literature. 
ROE = ßO+ ß1BSIZE + ß2BCOM+ ß3ASIZE+ є 
ROA =ß0+ ß1BSIZE + ß2BCOM+ ß3ASIZE+ є 
It is important to note that the ROA and ROE depend upon BSIZE, BCOM and AUSIZE. 
 
Whereas: 
ß=Intercept 
ROA = Return on Assets. 
ROE= Return on Equity 
BSIZE= Board size 
BCOM= Board composition 
ASIZE= Size of audit committee 
є = Standard error of the sample 
Empirical Results and Discussion 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 below shows the descriptive statistics of all the variables used in this study. Descriptive statistics were 
carried out to obtain sample characteristics. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the whole sample 
 Range Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Board size 9 5 14 8.83 1.999 
Board composition 7 3 10 6.79 1.921 
Audit committee size 3 2 5 3.08 .759 
Return on Equity 6.3747 -3.6235 2.7511 .136022 .6839601 
Return on Assets .5866 -.3875 .1991 .019596 .0881506 
           
The above descriptive statistics shows the number of directors in the board have a wide range from 5 to 14. The 
mean of the size of the board is 8.83, with a standard deviation of 1.999. This is in par with many studies 
undertaken previously. The Cadbury Committee report (1992) also recommends the size of the board to be 
between 8 and 10 members. It can be noted from Table 1 that the proportion of the number of non executive 
directors sitting on the board is about 6.79. This indicates that from the board size approximately 70% of them 
are non-executive directors. Considering the composition of the audit committee, the number of members floats 
from 2to 5directors. 
 
Results of Pearson Correlation Analysis 
Table 4.2 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients between dependent variables and independent variables to 
find out the relationship between determinants of corporate governance and the measures of firm performance. 
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix 
 
 
The results of the correlation analysis in table 02 show that the determinants of corporate governance such as 
board size, board composition are not significantly correlated with ROE and ROA as the measures of firm 
performance. But there is a significant relationship between Audit committee and ROE at 0.05 levels. But there 
is no significant relationship between Audit committee and ROA. 
 
Regression Analysis 
A simple linear regression was carried out to recognize the impact of corporate governance on firm performance. 
Table 3 shows the results of the analysis. 
Table 3: Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .231(a) .053 .016 .6785275 
1 .157(b) .025 -.014 .0887626 
a & b  Predictors: (Constant), Audit committee size, Board size, Board composition 
a. Dependent Variable: Return on Equity 
b. Dependent Variable: Return on Assets 
The specification of the three variables in the model revealed the ability to predict performance. R2 Value of 
0.053 and 0.025 which are in the models denote that 5.3%, and 2.5% of the observed variability in performance 
can be explained by the differences in both the independent variables namely board size, board composition, and 
audit committee. But, remaining percentage of variance is attributed to other factors. R2 values indicate that 
there may be number of variables which can have an impact on performance that need to be studied.  
Tables 4a and 4b show the analysis of variance (ANOVA) of the variables. With F- values of 0.638 and 1.423 
for ROA and ROE as performance proxies respectively, it clearly shows that there is no relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance. 
 
  
Correlations
1 .762** .559** .134 -.026
.000 .000 .235 .816
80 80 80 80 80
.762** 1 .601** .105 .076
.000 .000 .355 .502
80 80 80 80 80
.559** .601** 1 .223* .059
.000 .000 .047 .605
80 80 80 80 80
.134 .105 .223* 1 .161
.235 .355 .047 .154
80 80 80 80 80
-.026 .076 .059 .161 1
.816 .502 .605 .154
80 80 80 80 80
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Board size
Board composition
Audit committee
Return on Equity
Return on Assets
Board size
Board
composition
Audit
committee
Return on
Equity
Return on
Assets
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*. 
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Table 4a: ANOVA- ROA as a dependent variable 
 
 
Table4b: ANOVA- ROE as a dependent variable 
 
Table 5: -Coefficients for predictors of performance 
 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized t 
 
Sig. 
  B Std. Error Beta 
Dependent Variable ROE ROA ROE ROA ROE ROA ROE ROA ROE ROA 
(Constant) -517 .019 .376 .049   -1.376 .390 .173 .697 
Board size .025 -.009 .060 .008 .072 -.214 .412 -1.201 .681 .234 
Board composition -.034 .009 .065 .008 -.094 .207 -.518 1.117 .606 .267 
Audit committee size .215 .006 .128 .017 .239 .054 1.679 .375 .097 .709 
The relationship between board size, board composition and audit committee and the two performance measures 
is not statistically significant. The implication of this is that for the sampled firms, there is no relationship 
between the firms’ financial performances and corporatwe governance. Further t values for all four variables of 
corporate governance are insignificant event at 5% level. It means that these variables are not contributing to the 
performance measures of ROA and ROE. This outcome also has the support of Forsberg (1989), Weisbach 
(1991), Bhagat and Black (2002) and Velnampy (2013). 
 
Conclusion and Recommendation 
The present study analyzes the relationship between corporate governance of financial services industry and their 
performances. Using correlation and regression, we examine the effects of corporate governance and firm 
profitability in terms of ROE and ROA. The sample consists of 20 companies for the period 2008-2011. The 
results of the study provide evidence that the corporate governance measures are not significantly correlated with 
ROE and ROA as the performance measures. So that hypotheses one and two are rejected. The results suggested 
that future research should be carried out with a larger sample. Greater flexibility in acceptable governance 
structures may therefore be necessary if shareholder interests are to be promoted. Hence further research is 
significantly recommended.  
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